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GOETHE'S SOUL CONCEPTION.
BY THE EDITOR.
THE present number of The Open Court contains an article
"What is God?" by Orlando J. Smith, and I heartily recommend
to our readers a careful consideration of the ideas there presented.
I do not hesitate to say that Mr. Smith's God-conception is the same
as my own. In fact he uses quite similar arguments, in one case
the very same in almost the same language as I do myself ;—I refer
to the one based upon the eternality of such truth as is represented
by the multiplication table.
Our differences begin when he discusses the nature and im-
mortality of the soul. To him the soul is a monad, a unit, a certain
something which migrates from one personality to another and is
reincarnated again and again. This view is untenable from my
conception of things spiritual, because spiritual things are not enti-
ties. They are not substantial, and they can never assume the forms
of monads. If the soul is not a substantial entity that originates
;
if it is form and not matter or energy, its continuance can not depend
upon the identity of a substance of any kind bvit must be a preser-
vation of form. This in fact is the real state of things, for a pres-
ervation of form actually takes place in our bodily constitution.
There is a preservation of our bodily appearance under constant slow
modifications ; we retain the structure of our sense organs, and espe-
cially of our memory. The continuity of our life is simply due to the
preservation of form in the constant flux of the vital functions which
constitute life. The changes, growth, and all the various fluctua-
tions of our body account most easily for those of our consciousness.
The fundamental problem of psychology has found its classical
formulation in the contrast that obtains between Brahmanism and
Buddhism, the former set forth in the philosophy of both the
Vedanta and the Upanishads, and the latter in the Questions of King
Milinda and other Buddhist books. Brahmanism asserts. Buddhism
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denies the separate existence of a soul entity, called atman, i. e..
"self,"—an immutable eternal self. And if the Vedanta view i-
taken seriously, there is no middle g^round. Either the soul is or
is not a concrete substantial thin.c:. Tcrtiion iioii dotitr. There is
but the one alternative of yea or nay. and we must accept either
horn of the dilemma. The only way to reconcile the two views
would be by takins^^ the \'e(lanta view as a poetical allej^^orv invented
for the purpose of drivin.q- home to the ])eople the truth of the
actuality and importance of the soul.'
The assumption of a soul-entity not only conflicts with facts
that are well established by science but also leads into innumerable
complications. For these reasons we reject the Vedanta view of
an atman, and side with the Buddhist doctrine of the anatman, the
non-existence of a special self. Nevertheless the soul remains as
real as ever, and the rules of morality g-ain rather than lose in sig-
nificance
; for we must insist that the actions of man are even more
important if they mould the soul, than if we assume it to be an im-
mutable entity.
Having repeatedly discussed the problem of the soul, both in
articles and books, (for instance The Soul of Man and Whence and
Whither), we will not enter here into the subject again, but we w^ill
say that Mr. Orlando J. Smith's view of the soul is of great interest
to us, on account of the similarity which it bears to Goethe's view.
Goethe had a dislike for abstract considerations. He was too
much of a poet and liked to think even spiritual truths in such a way
as to let them assume a definite and concrete shape. He was too
human not to prefer the scnse-j^erceptible image which is palpable,
to the formula which is general and devoid of all tangible elements,
and so if certain views became too abstract for him he clothed them
in poetical allegories.
As to his view of the nature of the soul Goethe was careful not
to commit himself definitely in his writings, but in conversation he
now and then uttered ideas which indicate that his views of re-
incarnation resembled strongly the Vedanta view and also the theory
here presented by Mr. Orlando Smith.
The main tenets of immortality, and even of reincarnation, are
repeatedly expressed in Goethe's own writings and in his letters.
We have collected the pertinent evidences in an article on the subject
'The subject has been treated in an article "Brahmanisni and Buddhism,
or the Religion of Postulates and the Religion of Facts" in The Open Court,
Vol. X, p. 4851 ff.
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which has appeared in The Open Court (Vol. XX, p. 367 ff.) under
the title "Goethe's \''iew of Immortality."
In his writings Goethe abstained from committing himself to
the belief in a soul-entity, and his views are stated in such general
terms that they might suit either the Buddhists or the Vedantists,
but in his conversations he went further, taking decidedly the
Brahman view, and we will here present those additional expressions
of his thought which he mentions privately to Eckermann and Falk.
Goethe said to Eckermann on September i, 1829:
"I do not doubt our continuance, for nature can not do without
continuity ; but we are not all immortal in the same way, and in
order to manifest himself as a great entelechy, a man must first be
one."
Here Goethe falls back upon a technical term of Aristotle which
denotes that something which makes things actual. The word
"entelechy" means the cjuality of having become complete, of being
perfected, or having attained its purpose.- and is used in contrast
to "dynamis,"^ i. e., potential existence, which is the idea of a thing,
its possibility, its mere potentiality. Accordingly, entelechy denotes
that principle or factor which renders things actual.
The idea of an entelechy as a separate being is decidedly meta-
physical and, if taken seriously, would lead to dualism. There is
not reality and a principle that makes reality real. There is not
motion, and an agent of motion, a being that makes motion move.
There is not actuality and a thing that makes actuality act. The
actuality of things and also of living beings is their existence itself
and living beings (i. e., organisms) originate in a slow process of
evolution by a combination of their parts, or as we had better call
it by organization. We may regard them as actualizations of eternal
types, but in that case we can only mean their potential existence,
which is the possibility of their special combinations, in the same
sense as mathematical truths are eternal and exist even before any
mathematician has discovered and actualized them.
Goethe apparently takes the word in the sense of an entity. On
March 2, 1830, we find the term "entelechy" mentioned again in
another slightly different connection. There he is reported as hav-
ing said:
''' irrc/.txiia is derived from tm'/j'/c. "perfect", and tjfn', " to have". The ad-
jective iiTt/w means also "powerful, mighty, commanding"; and the verb trrfA-
/-tir, from which it is derived, "to enjoin, to command". The root of the latter -
the same as that of the noun ri'/.oc. "end", "purpose".
^ iK'vauic. potentiality.
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"The persistence of the individual and the fact that man rejects
what does not agree with him, are proofs to me that such a thing as an
entelechy exists. Leibnitz cherished similar ideas concerning such
independent entities, only that what we call 'entelechy' he called
'monads.' "
Almost seventeen years prior to these conversations with Ecker-
mann Goethe used the term "monad" in a talk with Falk who accom-
panied him on his return from the funeral of Wieland. With ref-
erence to the impossibility that Wieland's soul could have been an-
nihilated, Goethe said
:
"There can be no thought of an annihilation in nature of such
high psychic powers, nor under any conditions, for she is not waste-
ful of her capital. Wieland's soul is by nature a treasure, a real
gem. Moreover, during the whole of his long life he did not use
up these spiritual and beautiful talents, but increased them
"A personal continuance of our soul after death by no means
conflicts with the observations which I have made for many years
concerning the constitution of our own beings and all those in
nature. On the contrary, it seems to be an outcome of them and
finds in them new confirmation.
"How much or how little of a personality deserves to be pre-
served, is another question, and an affair which we must leave to
God. At present I will only say this: I assume different classes
and degrees of ultimate aboriginal elements of all beings which are,
as it were, the initial points of all phenomena in nature. I might
call them souls because from them the animation of the whole pro-
ceeds. Perhaps I had better call them monads. Let me retain this
term of Leibnitz, because it expresses the simplicity of these simplest
beings and there might be no better name. Some of these monads
or initial points, experience teaches, are so small and so insignificant
that they are fit only for a subordinate service and existence. Others
however are quite strong and powerful
"All monads are by nature so indestructible that they can not
stop or lose their activity at the moment of dissolution, but must
continue it in the very same moment. Thus they only part from
their old relations in order to enter at once into new ones. In this
change all depends on the power of intention which resides in this
or that monad.
"Each monad proceeds to whithersoever it belongs, into the
.water, into the air, into the earth, into the fire, into the stars, yea
the secret tendency which conducts it thither, contains at the same
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time the secret of its future destiny. Any thought of annihilation
is quite exchided
"Should we venture on suppositions, I really do not understand
what could prevent the monad to which we owe the appearance of
Wieland on our planet to enter in its new state of existence into the
highest combination of this universe. By its diligence, its zeal, its
genius, through which it has incorporated into its own existence so
many historical states, it is entitled to anything. I should not be
astonished at all should I, after millenniums, meet Wieland again
as a star of the first magnitude. Then I should see him and bear
witness how he with his dear light would gladden and quicken
everything that would come near him.
"To bring light and clearness into the nebular existence of some
comet should be deemed a joyous task for a monad such as the one
of our Wieland ! Considering the eternity of this universe of ours,
no other duty, generally speaking, can be assumed for monads than
that they in their turn should partake of the joys of the gods as
blessed creative powers. They are conversant with the becoming
of creation. Whether called or uncalled, they come by themselves
from all sides, on all paths, from the mountains, from the oceans,
from the stars. Who can prevent them?
'T am sure that I, such as you see me here, have lived a thou-
sand times, and hope to come again another thousand times."
There is a great lack of lucidity in these sentences. On the
one hand the monads are the simplest realities, a kind of atoms,
which belong to fire, water, earth, and other elementary existences
;
on the other hand, they are psychic agencies, and are introduced to
personify the law that sways the formation of a nebula into a
planetary system ; and again they are assumed to be psychic entities.
Perhaps some monads are thought to be chemical atoms and others
psychic powers ; and the latter, after the fashion of the Greek deities,
are expected to do the work of the natural laws. Such thoughts
are poetry, not science ; fiction, not psychological facts ; mythology,
not philosophy.
If we knew Goethe from this passage alone we would say that
he was a mystic. We grant that he had a mystic vein whenever
he happened to speak or refer to the soul, but even here he disliked
the excrescences of mysticism. He avoided having anything to do
with clairvoyance and other pathological or semi-pathological phe-
nomena. He not only disliked to delve into inquisitions of mysterious
events, but also to analyze psychological problems in abstract specu-
lations. Thus his views remained hazy and indistinct. He accepted
750 THE Ol'EN COURT.
imniortality as a fact, not because it could be ])rovC(l.— iti fact be
thoug^bt it could not be proved.—but because be could not dispense
witb an infinite outlook into tbc past as well as tbc future.
( iotbe's conversation witb Falk is perba])s tbe most important
passage to be quoted on tbc mooted topic, and it may be well to
bear in mind tbat it was I'alk and not Goetbe wbo wrote tbese sen-
tences, and tbat tbey tberefore must be used witb discretion. Never-
theless we can not doubt tbat Cioetbc held similar views, an<l tbat
be believed in the existence of monads or entelecbies. Yea tbe ex-
I)ression was so dear to him tbat in his first conception of tbe con-
clusion of Faust he used the word entelechy when sayin<j that
Faust's soul was carried uj) to heaven by an^^els. In tbe printed
editions he replaced it by the term "Faust's Immortal."
Eckermann has recorded several of Goethe's remarks which
corroborate, at least in c^eneral, that he held these notions. For in-
stance under March ii, 1828. we find the following^ comment of
Goethe's
:
"Each entelechy is a piece of eternity, and those few years
during which it is joined to its terrestrial body do not make it old."
In a conversation witb his friends. Chancellor von Mueller
and Herrn von Riemer, October 19. 1823. Goethe declared that it
would be quite impossible for a thinking being to entertain the idea
of its own non-existence or tbc discontinuance of its thought and
life. Accordingly every one carried a proof of his own immortality
quite immediately in himself, but as soon as he tried to commit him-
self to objective statements, as soon as he would venture to come out
with it, as soon as be wanted to prove dogmatically or comprehend a
personal continuance, as soon as he would bolster up this inner ob-
servation in a commonplace way, he woidd lose himself in contra-
dictions."
In his "Prose Sayings" Goethe says:
"The highest we have received from God and Nature is life,
viz., tbe rotating motion of tbe monad arouild itself, which knows
no rest nor ceasing. The tendency to preserve and cherish life is
naturally and indelibly inborn in every one, but its nature remains
a mystery to us as well as to others. The second favor which comes
from the Supreme Being is what we call experience in life, our be-
coming aware of things, and the influences which the living and
moving monad exerts upon the surroundings of tbe outer world.
Thereby the monad feels itself as infinite within and limited with-
out."
—
Spri'iche in Prosa, 1028- 1029.
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In a conversation with Chancellor von Miiller. February, 25,
1824, Goethe expressed his dislike to investig-ate the question of life
after death.
"To be engrossed with the ideas of immortalit}- is only for the
leisure classes, and especially for women who have nothing to do.
An able man who needs to make himself useful here, and who ac-
cordingly has to exert himself daily, to struggle and to work, leaves
the future world alone and is active and useful in this one."
Considering all these quotations it is certain that Goethe as-
sumed the existence of a soul-entity, an entelechy or monad, which
in his opinion was necessary for comprehending the nature of the
soul and its immortality, and the latter was not the traditional Chris-
tian, but an Oriental belief, i. e., a reincarnation or metempsychosis
of some kind. He speaks repeatedly of his former existences ; so
for instance in a poem addressed to Frau von Stein, he declares
that in the sympathy which binds their souls, he feels that in "by-
gone ages she must have been either his sister or his wife."'*
When he traveled in Italy Goethe declared that he must have
lived there, and he went so far as to state that it must have been in the
days of the Emperor Hadrian. Pie wrote on October 12, 1786 from
\"enice
:
"Indeed I feel even now as if I were not seeing things here for
the first time, but as if I saw them again."
With all due respect for his greatness, we believe that Goethe
has not elaborated his views of the soul nor matured them into clear
and scientifically tenable propositions. He was too much of a poet
and too little of a philosopher,—in spite of his several scientific
labors. He actually disliked explanations in abstract terms. It is.
however, interesting to find that ]\Ir. Orlando J. Smith in his con-
ception of immortality is backed by such a great man as Goethe.
*
"Ach, du warst in abgelebten Zeiten
Meine Schwester oder meine Frau."
